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SPINOZA ON FREEDOM, INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POWER
Modesto Gómez-Alonso
Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, España
Abstract
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of Spinoza’s most 
conspicuous political doctrines: his rejection of classical contractualism, his 
doctrine of the equivalence of right and power, his description of the limits 
of government either as logical limitations or as restrictions, not of power, 
but of impotence, and his defence of democracy as the most natural and 
most rational form of the state. Also, two alleged paradoxes that permeate 
Spinoza’s political thought are solved: the conflict between a naturalistic 
approach and a discourse whose purpose is to shed light on the grounds of 
political legitimacy, and the tension between the dynamics of freedom and 
the dynamics of power. Far from obsolete, Spinoza’s political philosophy 
comes to light as able to meet the demands of the contemporary world.
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Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es arrojar luz sobre las doctrinas políticas más 
significativas de Spinoza: su rechazo del contractualismo clásico, la tesis 
de la equivalencia de derecho y poder, la descripción de los límites del 
gobierno bien como limitaciones lógicas o como medios para garantizar 
la independencia y el poder del estado, y su refrendo de la democracia 
como la forma más natural y racional de constitución política. Además, se 
resuelven dos paradojas que, supuestamente, amenazan con desarticular 
su pensamiento político: el conflicto entre una perspectiva naturalista y un 
discurso que pretende alcanzar los fundamentos de la legitimidad política, 
y la tensión entre la dinámica de la libertad y la del poder. El resultado es 
una vindicación de la relevancia de la filosofía política de Spinoza para el 
mundo contemporáneo. 
Palabras clave: Democracia; derechos naturales; Hobbes; libertad; poder 
público.
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Modesto Gómez Alonso
Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, España
Introduction 
The now prevailing lack of interest in Spinoza’s political philosophy 
stems from two pervasive misconceptions: (i) the belief that he was a 
thinker whom practically no one read, understood or was influenced by, 
namely, that Spinoza was a thoroughly isolated and lofty thinker, a spider 
who carefully weaved a web of abstract concepts detached from experience 
and unconcerned about practical questions; and (ii) the entrenched view of 
him as a «revisionist Hobbesian» (Curley, 1996: 318), that is to say, as a 
reactive thinker who came accidentally (as it were, after second thoughts) to 
politics and whose political opinions are minor discrepancies within a general 
framework borrowed from Hobbes. Consequences are obvious: Spinoza is a 
second-order political thinker, one who doesn’t stand comparison with the 
members of the so-called «great tradition»: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.
The first misconception came to obscure the reality that he was actually 
a socially and politically highly engaged thinker, a philosopher concerned 
with human self-fulfilment from the early phase of his philosophical career 
(Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect),1 who not without reason 
1 Practical concerns are core constituents of the Rationalist tradition rooted in Descartes. 
The therapeutical aims of the Cartesian method are to force the exercise of uncorrupted 
reason (both in the arenas of intellectual and practical affairs), and to overcome every sort 
of personal disintegration and self-alienation, be it an epistemic divorce between the subject 
and his beliefs or an ethical division between the subject and his actions. It makes sense to 
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entitled his mayor work Ethics, and who was both an active participant in 
the religious and political turmoil which led to the murder of the brothers 
De Witt and to the overthrow of the Dutch Republic, and a tactical and 
strategic ally of fringe Christians (especially Collegians and Socinians) and 
Cartesians.2 Moreover, this misunderstanding plays down the importance of 
Spinoza in shaping the characteristic values of modernity. It obscures the 
facts that he was the silent inspirer of radical Enlightenment from Bayle and 
Toland to Condillac,3 and the founder of secular Bible’s hermeneutics. In the 
Theological-Political Treatise (which provoked a strong reaction and was 
condemned together with the works of Hobbes), he distinguished sharply 
between reason and faith, denying that the Bible is the source of truth, 
arguing that it is a text among others, a document compiled from different 
authors with incompatible beliefs and world-views, and disparaging prophets 
as men gifted, not with a sound intellect, but with a powerful imagination 
able to present in a vivid form moral truisms. 
At least, the second misunderstanding is plausible. Not only was Spinoza 
an attentive reader of Hobbes, but there are unquestionable similarities 
between them: (i) an unflinching advocacy of the mechanical philosophy 
which results in the ambitious programme of explaining man and society 
in terms of motion and power (according to natural causes), that is to say, 
in the project of creating a true science of politics; (ii) a shared rejection of 
the entire scholastic understanding of the will as one of the faculties of the 
human mind, the faculty which enables us freely to will and thereby freely 
to act, and which gives us «an absolute power to determine ourselves» 
(Spinoza, 2000: 39; G III: 277); (iii) the use of contractual terminology 
which, in the case of Spinoza, is conspicuous in the Theological-Political 
Treatise, although not completely absent from the Political Treatise; (iv) a 
pessimistic attitude regarding the function of reason in human affairs and the 
role played by private virtues in the political arena; and (v) the description of 
the commonwealth as the exclusive bearer of absolute power, a power which 
Hobbes concentrated in one point (the juridical person of the sovereign), and 
which Spinoza extended to the political body as a whole.4 Spinoza himself 
seems to minimize his divergences with Hobbes when addressing this very 
issue. He writes to Jarig Jellis:  
view Spinoza’s political reflections as the natural development of the ethical worries that 
permeate Descartes’s latter writings. For Cartesian therapy, see Marlies, 1978: 89-113. For 
Cartesian ethics, see Naaman-Zauderer, 2010: 178-204. 
2  Cfr. Balibar, 1998: 51-56. 
3 Cfr. Israel, 2001: 258-274.
4 Cfr. Spinoza, 2000: 44; G III: 282. 
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«As regards political theories, the difference which you inquire about 
between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I always preserve natural 
right intact, and only allot to the chief magistrates in every state a right over 
their subjects commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of 
the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of nature.» (Spinoza, 
1901: 369; G IV: 238-239)
Nonetheless, scholars stress the similitudes between Hobbes and 
Spinoza at their own peril.5 I want to call attention to three facts. 
(i) In the text just quoted Spinoza implicitly repudiates the very 
foundations of Hobbes’s political system: the description of the political 
covenant as a transference of power, and the subsequent equivalence 
between nominal power (power de iure) and real power (power de facto) 
in which is grounded the Hobbesian identification of absolute and personal 
power. According to Spinoza, concentrated power is equivalent to weakness 
(individual power). In other words: Spinoza accuses Hobbes of smuggling 
moral notions and transcendental elements into his naturalistic approach.   
(ii) Spinoza’s political philosophy stems from the key conceptions of 
his metaphysics: the definition of God’s freedom as freedom from constraint, 
that is, the equivalence between free actions and actions which follow solely 
from the internal laws of the nature of the thing which acts;6 the rejection of 
conventional moral concepts from physics and thereby from the physics of 
the commonwealth (what we could dub robust atheism projected to politics); 
and the notion of conatus, namely, the impetus or striving to persevere in its 
being which constitutes «the actual essence of the thing» (Spinoza, 1992: 
3p7; G II: 146).
(iii) If we paid attention to Spinoza’s political works we’d see that they 
are peppered with approving comments to and implicit quotations of Livy, 
Sallust and, over all, Tacitus. If we took into account that these historians 
traced the subversion of the republican civitas libera (free commonwealth) 
and its collapse into the servitude of the empire, that they were concerned 
about the long-term psychological consequences of abject servitude, and 
that they proposed a theory of political liberty which was one of the most 
powerful theoretical weapons used by the English Parliament against the 
King and which Hobbes successfully tried to discredit and supersede, we’ll 
be able to identify the true affiliations of Spinoza and, of course, the sources 
of his deep rejection of Hobbes.
5 Cfr. Della Rocca, 2008: 210.
6 Cfr. Spinoza, 1992: 44-46; G II: 61-63. 
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What I’m suggesting is that Spinoza’s political system stands on its own, 
that it is a coherent development of his metaphysical and methodological 
principles, and that Spinoza’s confrontation with Hobbes is at the very 
best accidental. But insofar as Hobbes’s conception of liberty has risen to 
present prominence, I think that the English philosopher is the perfect foil 
to Spinoza too. The objective of this paper is to identify the deepest root 
of Spinoza’s most conspicuous political doctrines: his rejection of contract 
and individualism, his doctrine of the equivalence of right and power, his 
identification of rights and laws, his description of the limits of government 
either as logical (physical) limitations or as restrictions, not of power, but 
of impotence, and his defence of democracy as the most natural and most 
rational form of the state. His whole politics develops in an intelligible 
and coherent way from his concept of freedom, a notion closely related to 
Nietsche’s will to power.
I want to be clear from now, including a disclaimer. Although I’m 
not attempting to conceal my sympathy for Spinoza, I’ll try to avoid 
confrontation as far as possible. My motto will be: «not to laugh at or 
lament over or despise, but to understand» (Spinoza, 1992: 102; G II: 138). 
Obviously, I’ll try to win a case, but not a case against the truth of Spinoza’s 
claims, but against their importance. This is rooted in a firm conviction that 
Spinoza’s strategies are effective for clearing the current muddle which 
political theory has become, a muddle brought about by a motley collection 
of dualisms. At the very least we could learn from him that the metaphor of 
social contract offers no real payoff. 
Hobbes’s Concept of Freedom 
Hobbes’s revolutionary approach to liberty surfaces as soon as he 
considers situations in which we are forced to choose, that is, those situations 
in which we feel that we are acting under duress. His favourite instance of 
such a predicament, one which he cites both in The Elements of Law and 
in Leviathan, and which he borrows from Aristotle, is the case of a man 
who, to save his person, «throweth his goods into the Sea» (Hobbes, 1985: 
262). Contrary to the scholastic philosophers represented by Bramhall in 
his debate with Hobbes, who defended that free agents are moved to act by 
reason as opposed to passion and that to act out of appetite (including fear) 
was not to act as a free man, and thereby that in the cited case the action 
was not altogether voluntary, Hobbes states that this action is «altogether 
voluntary» (Hobbes, 2008: 71), and that the man acted «very willingly» 
(Hobbes, 1985: 262).
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At first sight Hobbes’s answer is deeply counter-intuitive. Let us 
consider, for instance, questions related to equivalent situations: Is it a 
voluntary action for a Muslim minor to marry a man when the alternatives 
are prison or death? Is it a free decision for a nation to surrender territory 
when the alternative is total destruction and annihilation? Nonetheless, it 
stems from a subtle and detailed analysis of the conditions of freedom, one 
whose objective is to demonstrate that fear and freedom and that subjection 
to political power and freedom are compatible. The first thesis validates a 
covenant out of fear. The latter attempts to undermine the claim that being 
a subject and being a slave are the same condition under two different 
descriptions. According to Hobbes, the advocates of this opinion were 
men «that in their youth having read books written by famous men of the 
ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and 
great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by the 
glorious name of liberty (…); they became thereby in love with their forms 
of government» (Hobbes, 2007: 3).
In order to circumscribe the problem faced by Hobbes, and to be fair 
to the minute arguments deployed by him, it is apposite to make some 
preliminary distinctions:
(i) Hobbes’s object of scrutiny is law, its nature, function and limits. 
Laws constitute a prescriptive or normative framework, a framework that 
enforces subjects to do or not to do certain things. But «law» is an ambiguous 
term, which applies with different meanings to the fixed rules governing 
nature and to the conventional norms regulating a commonwealth. Natural 
laws are inescapable, but, because of this, they are not restrictions of freedom: 
as omnipotence is not limited by God’s inability to make something to be 
and not to be at the same time, human freedom is not limited by natural or 
logical contradictions. But conventional laws are traditionally conceived 
as impediments that take away freedom, as restrictions akin to chains or 
physical obstacles that prevent us of doing (against our will) what we could 
otherwise do. Hobbes’s goal is to demonstrate that conventional laws are 
not external impediments of freedom. Which means that he must show how 
laws can be enforced at all, and, over all, what is this freedom that allegedly 
laws take away.
(ii) The analysis of freedom is thus required by the very question faced by 
Hobbes: Are freedom and law compatible? The first step towards its solution 
is Hobbes’s celebrated distinction between ability (power) and freedom.7 In 
order to illustrate this point, let us consider an example. Had prevented a 
7 Cfr. Hobbes, 1985: 261-262.
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blizzard my reaching Madrid and my taking a flight to England, my will to 
be this night in Eastbourne had been frustrated. In such a case, I hadn’t been 
free to be reading this paper. But if English were «all Greek to me», to say 
that I wasn’t free to read this paper would be absurd: in this latter case, I 
would lack the capacity of reading English, something very different from 
being impeded to do it. «Free» and «unfree» are thus adjectives that only 
apply to actions within my power. Lack of freedom must be distinguished 
from lack of ability: we lack freedom only when an action within our powers 
has been rendered impossible, when we cannot do what we are able to do.
(iii) But «freedom» is an ambiguous word, a term which can refer 
either to the suspension of judgment (and of action) previous to the end of 
a deliberation (liberty as the weighting of reasons or appetites which defines 
the action of deliberating) or to the decision that brings deliberation to an 
end and that it is free insofar as it is voluntary.8 It is important to note this 
difference, since freedom of judgment is a capacity that, whatever could be 
the relation between the law and voluntary action, the sovereign is unable 
to take away, an ability that cannot be suppressed or surrendered and which 
constitutes one of the basic conditions of liberty. The question of political 
freedom does not arise here. In other words, laws are external impediments 
(restrictions of action) or no impediments at all. The divide between the 
internal (freedom of judgment) and the external (freedom of action) is 
common ground for Hobbes and Spinoza. But while Hobbes interprets it as 
an argument for arbitrary power, Spinoza reads it as a severe check on power: 
since freedom of judgment cannot be suppressed in the civil state, liberty 
of thought makes judges of subjects. According to Spinoza, our will can be 
won by power, but it cannot be convinced by force. And a commonwealth 
whose foundations are not «the trust which is the first essential of a state» 
(Spinoza, 2007: 255; G III: 243) and the «obedience» which is «the steadfast 
will to carry out orders enjoined by the general decree of the commonwealth» 
(Spinoza, 2000: 62; G III: 296), is not a commonwealth at all.
We are in position now to appreciate the ingenious analysis of freedom 
provided by Hobbes, and to understand the inescapable political conclusions 
that it entails:
(i) Insofar as one is not free (or unfree) for contradicting natural laws or 
for suppressing his nature, actions will be free if they are within our power 
and if they are voluntary. Whether or not externally impeded, voluntariness 
of action is what makes agents of individuals. In other words, all free actions 
are voluntary but not every act of volition is per se free. Freedom can be 
8 Cfr. Hobbes, 2008: 12.1.
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taken away in two senses: either because action is not voluntary or because 
a willing act is impeded by external causes. I wouldn’t be free for arriving 
here under a blizzard, but the blizzard doesn’t take away my will to be here.
(ii) What is the meaning of «being an agent»? What are the sufficient 
conditions of a voluntary act? First of all, deliberation, namely, the exercise 
of the capacity of weighting alternative courses of action that, according to 
Hobbes, is shared by humans and animals. Actions that don’t proceed from 
deliberation, either because they are out of blind impulse or because they 
are mechanical responses, are involuntary and thereby they are acts beyond 
the proper scope of freedom or its negation. In second place, will, that is to 
say, «the last appetite» (Hobbes, 2008: 12.2) which brings deliberation to an 
end, and which makes of a given course of action something decided by me. 
It is important to pay attention to some aspects of this description: (a) 
According to Hobbes, the will is not a ghost faculty independent of particular 
acts of volition, a metaphysical faculty able to keep decisions in suspense 
and to terminate deliberation out of nothing. In this respect he subscribes 
a compatibilist view of freedom, claiming that «liberty and necessity are 
consistent» (Hobbes, 1985: 263). (b) Antecedents of action are always 
constituted by passions, which take the form either of appetites that induce 
us to act or of fears that hold us back from acting. We could say that for 
Hobbes reason is never a motive for action, that reason is a lieutenant of 
passions, a thwarted dwarf which, on the shoulders of a blind giant, cannot 
move on its own. This doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have a role. After all, 
it makes available different alternatives. But this role is ancillary: the final 
action stems from appetites. (c) Insofar as voluntary actions proceed from 
passions and fear is a passion, one is not acting against his will when acting 
out of fear. Moreover, since the ultimate fear (fear of violent death) is always 
the last movement of deliberation, the aversion which cancels the entire 
chain of appetites, those who act out of this overwhelming weight are acting 
«very willingly» indeed. Therefore, contracting out of fear of violent death 
and submitting to law out of fear of punishment are paradigmatic voluntary 
actions. Laws don’t take away agency. Laws are brought about voluntarily.
(iii) But are laws external impediments of voluntary action? Are they 
external constraints on motion, which prevent us from acting in agreement 
with our will? Insofar as fear is clearly not an example of an external 
impediment, and that laws are not physical chains, but norms enforced by 
fear of the consequences of wrongdoing, they do not take away freedom to 
act, namely, they are in no way analogous to «banks, or vessels» (Hobbes, 
1985: 262) impeding water to flow at liberty. Laws take away neither 
our capacity to transgress the law nor the actual power to perform the 
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transgression: this is why one always can act against the law. A citizen 
only is a slave insofar as he is actually deprived of movement by physical 
impediments, that is, insofar as he is acting under compulsion. Hobbes treats 
as a sufficient condition of being a free-man that we should be free from 
interference as a matter of fact, a condition met by a commonwealth where 
the sovereign keeps his subjects unchained and where he rules by fear, that 
is to say, by law. A subject is not a slave, since he is not impeded to do or 
not to do. Subjection to arbitrary power is not servitude, since the actions 
of every honest citizen always are voluntary and free.
I would like to finish this point correcting a common mistake. Since 
Hobbes described the political covenant as a covenant of authorization, 
the effect of which is to turn every subject into the author of all the actions 
performed by the sovereign in their names, it is usual to hold that for Hobbes 
it would be self-contradictory to disobey or resist the sovereign in any way, 
since no one can act against his own will. I think that the last expression is 
ambiguous, and that it would be wise to replace it by «No one can freely 
act against his will».
What I’m meaning is that, although we have conceded for the sake of the 
argument that it is possible to transgress the law freely, namely, that, since 
the law is not an external impediment of whatever action, lawless actions 
are free because unimpeded, it is important to note that lack of impediment 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for freedom. Freedom is a predicate 
only of voluntary actions. Which means that, since voluntary actions stem 
from deliberation, and the ultimate fear is that which brings deliberation to 
an end, lawful actions are the only ones that are voluntary and free. Criminals 
and rebels think that they are acting in agreement with their wills, but they 
are acting out of impulse, unimpeded but unfree. In the name of a fictional 
freedom they have debased themselves to a condition worse than that of 
animals. This is why one can act against his will without contradiction 
(according to a sense of «acting» or «doing» where one is acting without 
being a genuine agent),9 but it is self-contradictory to act voluntarily against 
one’s will, namely, against the sovereign’s will. It is relevant to note that 
reason (understood as the capacity of judgment) is quite important for 
Hobbes. No judgment, no freedom: the controversy between Spinoza and 
Hobbes is rooted in this motto. Curiously, such an extreme «rationalist» as 
Spinoza accused Hobbes of putting on the shoulders of deliberation a weight 
it cannot carry or throw away: the entire commonwealth.
9 In the case of functionally assessable states (such as the reflex kick under the doctor’s 
mallet where the patient kicks the nurse), it makes sense to say that the patient does something 
even if it is not a voluntary doing, one attributable to him as his doing.
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Spinoza’s Conception of Liberty 
It would be a mistake to detach Spinoza’s political theory from his 
contribution to ethics. It would be a much bigger mistake to think of his 
ethics as a paradigmatic example of Stoicism, namely, to hold that Spinoza 
was an advocate of a higher will presiding like a king over his appetites, of 
a external principle of control or will to refrain set above nature and able 
to bring spiritual anarchy to an end. A coherent atheist to the end, Spinoza 
clearly stated that «repentance is not a virtue» and that «he who repents of 
his actions is doubly unhappy or weak» (Spinoza, 1992: 4p54; G II: 250). 
Enemy of every kind of dualism, his rejection of a political body held 
together by a king external to it stems coherently from his repudiation of 
unnatural and autonomous psychological faculties.
In order to make clear what are for Spinoza the necessary conditions of 
political liberty and to understand why he entirely subverts the foundations 
of Hobbes’s political system, I’m going to briefly comment some of the key 
concepts pertaining to his metaphysics and to his ethics:
(i) The nature of a thing is the collection of appetites and aversions that 
constitute its internal essence, namely, those affections with which one (if he 
is a sentient being) is internally and intimately related, that one is not free for 
supressing without also supressing his individuality. The thing considered in 
its nature is an exemplary thing, one that acts as it acts because it is its nature 
to do so. When it is a human, the exemplar expresses and discloses himself 
in his actions. He is, in short, one with himself, one whose most natural state 
is to obey a thousand fold internal laws that precisely on account of their 
hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts. Let us pay 
attention to this point: complexity doesn’t entail fragility; on the contrary, 
it is the very fabric of nature and the very source of enrichment and power. 
(ii) Conatus is the striving to welfare that constitutes the nature of all 
things whatever. Conatus and essence are equivalent because power (conatus, 
welfare) is nothing else that faithfulness to oneself. The term conatus is 
ambiguous, since it refers to the striving to power and to the power defined 
as being one with oneself. But this ambiguity is only apparent: one who 
acts out of conatus is acting out of himself; conatus is not the cause, but the 
symptom or expression of welfare (a expression whose weight can decrease 
or increase according to circumstances, but which, insofar as one is still 
alive, cannot be suppressed): «We call ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that which is useful 
to, or harmful to, preserving our being, that is, what increases or decreases, 
aids or represses, our power of acting» (Spinoza, 1992: 4p18s; G II: 222).
Striving is something that a thing always does, whether it meets 
interference or not. A thing’s contribution to any effect of which it is a 
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partial cause can be understood in terms of its striving to remain in the same 
motion. Likewise, for Spinoza’s metaphysical doctrine, a given singular 
thing’s contribution to any effect of which it is a partial cause, even a harmful 
effect, can be understood in terms of its striving to persevere in being. As, 
when a rock in fact moves in a circle, we should nevertheless conceive of 
its contribution to that motion as a tendency to proceed in a straight line, 
so when a person does something selfless or self-destructive, we should 
nevertheless conceive of that person’s contribution to that action in terms 
of striving for perseverance. 
(iii) Reason is not a repressive or unnatural faculty whose function is 
to impose an external order on chaotic instincts, a stronger counter-tyrant 
opposed to the tyranny of affections. On the contrary, it is one element among 
others in the sum of natural drives which constitutes the essence of the 
individual, an element whose function is not to supress, but to integrate those 
very instincts in such a way that they don’t oppose each other and thereby 
that they don’t put in jeopardy the whole for which they are indispensable. 
Reason is thus the capacity of instincts for self-organization, the principle 
able to produce a totality whose multiplicity is nonetheless the converse of 
chaos. It is not opposed to conatus, but conatus itself. It is not opposed to 
power, but power itself.10 In short, reason is the drive to health.11 Obviously, 
wise men consciously following the path of reason for self-creation are rare. 
Nonetheless, since the goals of nature and the goals of reason are the same, 
nobody goes against reason when acting out of his nature. Common men 
do not act out of self-knowledge, but, following their instincts, they always 
act in accordance with reason. On the other hand, wise men regulate their 
lives paying attention to pleasure and discomfort.
(iv) Freedom is obedience to oneself, namely, a way of life defined by 
harmony between who we are and what we do. One who is free is one who 
has become what he is. The criterion of freedom is perfect welfare, that is, 
blessedness. And blessedness entails an affirmative attitude, a hearty assent 
10 According to the early Rationalists, degrees of reality and degrees of rationality are 
commensurate. To be irrational means for a contradiction not even to be a candidate to 
existence. At the other end of the scale, that God’s inexistence is impossible means that God 
is the paradigm of ens rationalis. It is not therefore surprising that for Spinoza increasing of 
power and independence is tantamount to increasing of rational status, and inversely, that the 
weaker the organism (and society is an organism of sorts) the lower its rational evaluation. 
For this point, see Lebuffe, 2010: 222-224. 
11 The application of this model to those negative passions that decrease our power, and 
that under the general label of “pain” (tristitia) Spinoza defines as the passive transition 
of the mind to a state of less perfection, is more restrictive. Reason’s role regarding these 
passions is one of disalienating therapy.  
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to life and to oneself. On the contrary, hatred and resentment are a symptom 
of servitude, impotence and self-alienation (one who is in bondage is one 
who is a empire within a empire).
(v) God is equivalent to Nature and to Life itself. The voice of God 
within us is nothing else that the voice of our essence, the voice of the power 
which, in a limited way, is part and parcel of the infinite power of God. 
Discomfort means alienation from nature and from God. Welfare is, on the 
contrary, beatitude. A most extreme repudiation of Christian morality cannot 
be found in Western philosophy before Nietzsche. It is not by chance that 
the latter, after reading Spinoza, had exultantly wrote: «I have a precursor, 
and what a precursor!» (Nietzsche, 1969: 89).
What are the political consequences following from this metaphysical 
framework?
The main result is the distinction between a voluntary action and an action 
out of freedom, namely, the introduction of a second concept of freedom: 
freedom as «acting from the necessity of his own nature» (Spinoza, 2000: 
41; G III: 279) or as self-realization, and the resultant redefinition of what it 
means to be an agent. The entire Political Treatise is entailed by this thesis.
It is important to note that, according to Spinoza, freedom doesn’t require 
deliberation. In other words, that deliberation is not a necessary condition 
of freedom. God, lacking a personal mind but acting from the sole laws of 
his essence (thoroughly unimpeded), is the paradigmatic case of absolute 
freedom of action. A rock acts with complete liberty insofar as it follows its 
natural tendency to move in a straight line. In this sense, to be an agent is 
not equivalent to act voluntarily, but to act according to internal necessity.
Neither is deliberation a sufficient condition of freedom. One can act 
«very willingly» and still be a partial cause of his action, namely, and still be 
only partially free. It is important to remember here that, insofar as it exists, 
striving is something that a thing always does. Which means that there is 
a common ground in all happenings: the striving of the thing to persist in 
its being; and thereby that freedom (nature, agency) always contributes to 
any effect, whether the natural movement of the thing is impeded or not. 
The ethical and political consequences of this doctrine are obvious: 
(i) Suicide does not stem from a drive to self-annihilation. On 
the contrary, it is the response of the striving to be to overwhelming 
interference, the consequence of a predicament where the individual is 
forced by unbearable circumstances to choose between two forms of personal 
disintegration: physical or psychological (and so painful) self-annihilation. 
(ii) He who is acting under duress is able to act against his long-term 
interests insofar as he is fighting to persevere. In this sense, the action of 
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the man who, to save his person, threw his good into the sea, is altogether 
voluntary, but not altogether free. His action stems from impotence, and not 
from internal necessity. Better expressed: his action is the result of essence 
adapting itself to impediments. And impediments bring about short-term 
interest, namely, willing actions. Willing actions are accidental, fragile, 
unstable and conditional. Free actions are constitutive, «eternal», stable 
and unconditional.
(iii) It is irrelevant whether impediments are external or internal. The 
man acting out of fear is not less bound (and impotent) than the slave kept 
in chains. The important thing is that, since there is a gap between who he 
is and what he does, since he is not acting out of hearty consent, since he is 
compelled by an alien power to do or not to do, since «human life» is not 
«just the circulation of the blood and other features common to all animals» 
(Spinoza, 2000: 62; G III: 296), since possible interference is as restrictive as 
interference as a matter of fact, he is a slave. This is why ideology, namely, 
abstract moralism as opposed to a morality highly sensitive to the texture 
and quality of human behaviour, is a constitutive element of the political 
mechanism of repression.
(iv) A human being does have the capacity of submitting to force, but 
he is unable to give himself away. We are not free for choosing our nature. 
This is why, although power can force us to acquiesce, it is unable to force 
us to love or to revere; why, when Hobbes and Spinoza talk about liberty 
of judgment, their meanings are different. For Spinoza liberty of judgment 
is liberty to consult our long-term interests, that is, the human capacity to 
become detached from a repressive political power, to be, through decrease 
or increase of power, the true measure of legitimacy. In this respect, arbitrary 
power always alienates his subjects, from itself and from themselves. It 
creates a gap between public performance and private judgement, a chasm 
where contempt, discomfort, protest and rebellion find their most congenial 
surroundings. «It is far from possible to make everyone speak according 
to a script» (Spinoza, 2007: 255; G III: 244). It is enough a cursory glance 
on Gibbon for understanding why a state unsupported by his people is 
doomed. Obedience is the most reliable criterion of a just commonwealth, of 
a commonwealth that holds absolute power insofar as his subjects have not 
become powerless by fear. The power of the commonwealth is equivalent 
to the power of its subjects. The most stable commonwealth is that where 
freedom cannot be supressed.
(v) Contractual theories are wrong because: (a) power (essence) 
can’t be transferred (a man is not free for giving himself away); (b) fear, 
which is the cause of the overthrowing of states, cannot be the cause of 
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the their formation; (c) a man who acts out of fear is the enemy of the man 
of whom he is afraid, and the latter (the arbitrary sovereign) is in state of 
war with his subjects: which means that a commonwealth such as the one 
described as Hobbes is as impossible as Hobbes’s natural state; (d) insofar 
as when causes of fear disappear men return to their «natural motion», if 
Hobbes’s description of the origins of the commonwealth were correct, the 
overthrowing of a tyrant would entail the dissolution of society; but societies 
are not dissolved by revolutions, and commonwealths don’t follow the fate of 
their governments: which means that the origins of society must be rooted in 
nature, and not in convention, that is to say, that if internal necessity (hearty 
consent, assent as agreement with oneself) is that which keeps bound the 
political body, it is also the very root from which it stems. 
In short: too ephemeral, the causes ascribed by Hobbes to the 
commonwealth under-determinate their effects. If the striving to power 
rules Nature, if men cannot survive and cannot flourish alone, if security 
is the result of living by common law, if life is preserved and enhanced by 
common power, the commonwealth cannot be an external impediment of 
freedom. It has to be our destiny, one of the laws inscribed within our hearts. 
This is why, although civil society does not proceed from explicit reasoning, 
it is in agreement with reason. Laws are the voice of reason when reason is 
idle. This is true naturalism: the abolition of dualisms projected to politics. 
Hobbes didn’t pay attention enough to the distinction made by the 
ancient Pyrrhonians between two kinds of assent: external approval and full 
consent. He also forgot that, in order to avoid be detached from themselves, 
in order to have a live of their own, human beings don’t repress their beliefs. 
Hobbes’s political theory is naturalized Platonism: good for automata, 
harmful for men. 
Two supposed paradoxes
Taken out of context, some highly charged expressions of the Political 
Treatise are prone to make the reader to shiver. «The law of Nature forbids 
nothing at all except that which is not within anyones’s power to do» 
(Spinoza, 2000: 45; G III: 282). «The right of the state (…) is determined 
by the power not of each individual but of a people which is guided as if 
by one mind» (Spinoza, 2000: 48; G III: 284-285). «The individual citizen 
does nothing and posses nothing by right beyond what he can defend by 
common decree of the commonwealth» (Spinoza, 2000: 48; G III: 285). 
These catchwords could easily be picked out of a Totalitarian treatise written 
by an advocate of an omnicompetent and omnipresent state whose only 
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limitations are the limits of its power to enforce laws. They seem too close 
to Rousseau’s notions of «social compact» and «General Will» for comfort, 
namely, too close to the proposal of a power not the least absolute, total, and 
penetrating for its declared roots in the people, a power capable to curtail 
anything resembling free associations and spontaneous social ties, and whose 
function is mainly a transcendental one: to purify people, to cleanse them 
of the false wills, desires and attitudes which history has implanted in their 
minds and personalities, to psychologically reconstitute them.
Spinoza viewed as an irregular pioneer who goes in front of the 
regular forces of revolution, as the first defender of permanent revolution: 
it is enough to remember that he coherently divorced the private virtue of 
«freedom of spirit or strength of mind» (Spinoza, 2000: 36; G III: 275) 
from the state’s virtue of security; that he considered it was ill-advised to 
change the form of the state (regicide as an invitation to tyranny); that he 
was a staunch supporter of liberty of thought, of speech and of press; that 
he defined a repressive law as that which inhibits spontaneous feelings and 
actions; and that he designed a minute system of checks and balances in 
order to avoid the concentration of power either into a Church, a party, a 
dictator, a corporation or an enthusiastic rabble; for exposing as a caricature 
whatever Rousseaunian account of Spinoza we could be in love with.12 
In this sense, the texts just cited mean something very different from 
what they seem to mean. The first text reminds us that, since one cannot 
give his nature away, the law of Nature is unable to prevent freedom of 
judgment, and hence that «love» and «reverence» cannot be compelled. 
In this respect, he is fixing the absolute and natural limits of the state: 
hearty consent on the part of its subjects. The second quotation stresses the 
same fact, stating that a commonwealth is the most powerful the most it is 
supported by common assent, namely, that a state whose actions «arouse 
general indignation» (Spinoza, 2000: 52; G III: 288) is doomed. Finally, 
the last remark states that men can never enjoy the rights of an uncivil 
state, and therefore that they have power (rights) insofar as they count 
on the common power. Private property is not a natural right that sets the 
fixed limits of public interference. On the contrary, since common power 
is the very condition of property, no one can be a proprietor without being 
a subject to law too. Because the proprietor owes everything he possesses 
to the commonwealth, his refusal to pay taxes is an invitation to self-
destruction: trying to minimize the state he is undermining the very structure 
12 For an early and highly influential Marxist reading of Spinoza’s political philosophy, one 
that is the paradigmatic example of what is usually called “Red Spinozism”, cfr. Matheron, 
1969: 612.
26
sp
in
o
zA
 o
n
 fr
ee
d
o
M
, i
n
d
iv
id
u
A
l 
r
iG
h
ts
 A
n
d
 pu
b
li
c
 po
w
er
that makes his rights possible at all; acting out of short-term interest he is 
conspiring against himself.
This notwithstanding, scholars13 never fail to point to two alleged 
paradoxes weaved into the very fabric of Spinoza’s political theory:
(i) He obviously designed a system of checks and balances in order to 
prevent tyranny, but it’s equally obvious that he was a staunch supporter 
of a commonwealth whose power was absolute. Moreover, he explicitly 
defended that «the completely absolute state» is that «which we call 
democracy» (Spinoza, 2000: 135; G III: 358). The questions are: How is 
it possible without contradiction to establish a cunning layout of obstacles 
and hindrances in order to restrict power, and yet to be an advocate of 
unlimited power? How is it possible to conciliate two opposite principles: 
republicanism and absolutism?
(ii) Spinoza’s political thought endeavours to maximize individual 
liberty under the state, in such a way that he considers that «the true purpose 
of the state is in fact freedom» (Spinoza, 2007: 252; G III: 241). Nonetheless, 
he is also an extreme naturalist, a philosopher who considers that the notion 
of «natural inalienable rights» is absurd, that the only limits of political 
power are physical contradictions, namely, those things that a sovereign 
is unable to do (the only thing that the sovereign is forbidden to do is that 
which he is incapable to do: abstract and rule-like moral impediments are 
not impediments at all), and thereby that, unconcerned about questions of 
legitimacy, he seems to give full rein to coercing power while complaining 
of it. The dynamics of freedom seems the converse of the dynamics of power. 
Apparently, Spinoza wanted to follow both paths to reach the same point.
Spinoza’s claims about freedom and power seem hopelessly confused 
and contradictory. Two main strategies seem available: to show that the 
contradiction is only apparent, or to admit the contradiction but to argue 
that its presence in Spinoza’s work teaches us something important about 
both concepts. Edwin Curley has advocated the latter procedure, supporting 
a Hobbesian (bowdlerized) version of Spinoza. The first strategy has been 
deployed by those scholars who, underlining the difference between potentia 
(power) and potestas (authority), try to convince us of the fact that, although 
for Spinoza power constitutes the essence of every state, he defended that 
only commonwealths based on authority are legitimate. The problem is that, 
while Curley breaches the basic law of a reasonable interpretation: to attribute 
to a text the best position compatible with the relevant evidence about its 
meaning; Spinoza’s defenders introduce a moral concept into a political 
13 Cfr. Balibar, 1998: 103-105.
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theory whose aim is to eliminate moralism from the study of politics. It is 
clear that Spinoza uses the notion of «authority», but expunged of a moral 
sense: as power supported by people, that is, as absolute power.
My aim is to show that there is no contradiction, but not because Spinoza 
superimposed prescriptive terms onto the language of power. On the contrary, 
the dynamics of freedom and the dynamics of power are equivalent.
My objective is to demonstrate: (i) that the main obstacle to understanding 
Spinoza is the fact that moral concepts permeate our political beliefs, thus 
fostering the opposition between individual rights and public power; (ii) 
that Spinoza’s language must be interpreted within a naturalistic framework: 
legitimacy as absolute power, absolute power as power supported by people, 
system of checks and balances as obstacles against impotence, and not as 
hindrances of power, and so on; (iii) and that, since limits of power never 
are limitations, namely, since the power of the sovereign is only curbed 
either by physical impossibilities or by facts which stem from physical 
impossibilities, civil state, absolute state, and state of freedom are three 
descriptions of the same condition.
What I mean is that Spinoza’s political thought endeavours to maximize 
individual liberty under the state by demonstrating the positive interaction 
between man’s individual and collective interests and the power of the 
sovereign, that, in Spinoza’s view, the state’s true strength and stability 
depends on the willingness of citizens to identify with, participate in, and 
support it. A commonwealth out of freedom is an absolute commonwealth.
This position is not too far from Chomsky’s: «When you eliminate the 
one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent –
namely the government- you’re simply handing over power to unaccountable 
private tyrannies that are much worse» (Chomsky, 2011: 263). And we could 
add: that are much worse because they are much weaker. Nevertheless, 
there is an important dissimilarity: for Spinoza to ultimately aiming at the 
elimination of the state (something which constitutes the final objective of 
an anarchist such as Chomsky) is both harmful and preposterous. In this 
matter he is much closer to the old English motto: liberty under the law. As 
a matter of fact, no other liberty is possible. 
The limits of political power 
Two theories of rights are prominent in the contemporary landscape 
of political philosophy. On the one side, the moral theory of inalienable 
natural rights rooted in the metaphysical nature of human beings and which 
fix the absolute limits of political power, a theory that goes back to Suárez 
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and Locke, is still widely accepted, whether as a true account of the human 
condition or for utilitarian reasons. On the other side, authors of a most 
naturalistic frame of mind who want to conserve rights and yet to keep 
uncommitted about their metaphysical foundations, are prone to define 
rights as «demands of recognition», that is, to state that rights are forms of 
life, desires and interests that are accepted by the whole society insofar as 
a particular creed, race, lobby or sexual orientation is powerful enough to 
gain freedom from the state. This conception, forcefully defended by James 
Fitzjames Stephen (Stephen, 1991: 118), stems from a view of the state as 
a conflict of forces that implies the negation of absolute liberty insofar as 
each force restrains the others. According to this view, a commonwealth is 
nothing else that the fragile equilibrium of conflicting interests, the delicate 
balance between common law and particular rights.
It is obvious that Spinoza’s position is incompatible with the moral 
conception of human rights. But he also had fiercely rejected the second 
account. For, at least, two reasons: (i) because it shares with the moral theory 
of rights the assumption that rights and laws are necessarily in conflict (a 
new form of dualism concealed within a secular language); and (ii) because 
it makes a state of war of the state, thinking of the commonwealth as a 
true miracle always about to collapse into nothingness. Unlike Rousseau, 
Spinoza was not a puritan attempting to impose a common and austere 
morality. Demands of recognition are not the problem. The problem is that 
they are not snatched from law, but implied by law. Absolute liberty is not 
impossible because men tend towards opposing each other, but because they 
tend towards living together. Spinoza’s point is that absolute liberty (the 
supposed liberty of a tyrant) is not power, but impotence. Men are not forces 
restricted by law. They become forces insofar as they live under the law.
This point brings us into the very core of this topic: Why are individual 
freedom and public power logically co-dependent concepts, concepts that 
come in tandem?
The solution is entailed by Spinoza’s naturalistic conception of the limits 
of civil law. They are limits that are not limitations, namely, they are not 
restrictions impeding actions that the sovereign is able to do, but physical and 
logical contradictions that, insofar as nobody has the capacity to do, nobody 
feels restrained for not doing. One of this physical limits is the capacity of 
judgment, which nobody is free for surrendering, «for what rewards and 
threats can induce a man to believe that the whole is not greater than its 
parts, or that God doesn’t exist, or that the body, which he sees to be finite 
is an infinite being, in short, to believe something that is contrary to what he 
perceives or thinks?» (Spinoza, 2000: 51) A second limit is our «affective 
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equipment», namely, the objects that we will or avoid: compelled by force 
or moved by interest, everyone is able to pretend a feeling, but no one is able 
to feel at will, to feel what he is not feeling. The basic principle of political 
power stems from these two impossibilities: ultimately the governors can 
only rule if they get the support of public opinion, no matter how many 
guns and armies they rely on. This is true of the most despotic societies 
and of the freest. If the majority of the population don’t accept things, the 
rulers are finished. This third impossibility could be dubbed impossibility 
of ruling without general consent. Spinoza was the first political thinker in 
paying minute attention to the power of public opinion, the first to identify 
the deepest source of power and the deepest cause of impotence.
But that general consent is the essential requirement of power means 
that, whatever could be the form of the state, people are the true depository 
of power. A fourth impossibility follows from this fact: power is inalienable 
and incapable of being usurped by or transferred to a private citizen (or to a 
conglomerate of private citizens). Which means that, insofar as sovereignty 
and power are equivalent, people always are the true sovereign, and that 
rulers only are the administers of the power of the commonwealth (which is 
the power of people), and not the logical subjects of power. It is important 
to note that, according to Spinoza, people are never free for giving power 
away, and not because they could not will to commit political suicide, but 
because private judgement and public opinion are imperishable: one cannot 
change his nature at will. People are unable either of willingly transferring 
power to a private citizen or of voluntarily contracting in such a way that 
they renounce future judgement, accepting as their «eternal will» the will to 
surrender their opinions to the «General Will» and to purify themselves from 
their human condition. Nothing is more alien to Spinoza than Rousseau’s 
transcendental utopia of community.   
It is usually said that Spinoza was a factualist, namely, that he defended 
that power is a self-justificatory concept, that power is legitimate insofar as 
it is power. As far as it goes, this remark is correct. Nevertheless, this thesis 
doesn’t make of Spinoza a supporter of tyrants. Not because tyrannies hold 
power, but are lacking of authority, but because they are both the effect and 
the cause of weakness, because, attacking people, tyrants isolate themselves 
from the source of power. As human beings acting out of impotence and 
resentment make a virtue (humbleness) of a necessity (weakness), arbitrary 
«sovereigns» make a virtue (display of force) of a vice (lack of consent). In 
this sense, every commonwealth that is not supported by people is powerless, 
and hence its right decreases in direct proportion to the increasing of its 
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violence. Display of force is the illusion of power and the reality of impotence. 
In short, one can be a full-fledged naturalist and yet to show that, since a 
government alienated from its subjects is like a house of cards which is going 
to collapse under the slightest pressure, factual government is not the same 
as factual power, and therefore that the king who is seating on a vulnerable 
throne is always about to fall down. Power is self-justificatory, but it cannot 
be confounded with violent reaction out of fear. Usurpers are forbidden by 
natural law. Because it is inalienable, true power never is illegitimate.
This account is capable of reconciling the dynamics of power and of 
freedom, transforming Spinoza’s political system into a coherent theory. 
Nonetheless, attentive readers could legitimately raise two strong objections: 
(i) Maybe it is true that private governments are, according to a possible 
interpretation of the word, «powerless»; but as a matter of fact they hold 
power, that is to say, they are able to abuse their subjects, to plunder at will, to 
trample on civil rights, to break laws with impunity, and «to make a wasteland, 
and call it peace» (Spinoza, 2000: 62; G III: 296). Is not Spinoza compelled 
by his own logic to state that, insofar as the only things that a government 
is forbidden to do are those that it is unable to do, governments acting out 
of violence are acting out of right? Is not he trying to smuggle prescriptive 
notions into a naturalist framework whose inescapable consequence is the 
cult of naked force? (ii) Maybe it is true that public opinion is the source 
of power, but public opinion is easily controlled and manipulated. In other 
words, governments and corporations too easily can either divert the rage 
and the frustration of people to convenient scapegoats or create a situation 
where subjects are all equal, equally lacking in the right to control their own 
fate, all capable of being passive, apathetic, obedient consumers and workers. 
This explains why the population submits to private rulers, even although 
power is always in the hands of the governed. It is enough a cursory glance 
to well-known military interventions under the banner of democracy (as 
a matter of fact, acts of aggression) to see how easily a population whose 
fears are cunningly aroused can bless the very hand of those who are the 
scourge of their fatherland. Was Spinoza an idealist, a utopian, an armchair 
philosopher blind to real politics?
In order to meet the first objection it is necessary to distinguish the 
limits of doing from the limits of ruling. Public opinion is not an external 
impediment of doing, but of ruling. A private governor (like a private 
citizen) is able to transgress a written or an unwritten law. In this sense, he 
is acting by right insofar as he is doing that which he is free to do. But a 
private government is unable (unfree) to keep power when it is acting against 
the general feeling of the commonwealth: this is a logical impossibility, 
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something forbidden by the laws of nature. Governments act out of violence 
at their own peril. In other words, a government has the right (the power, the 
capacity) to keep power insofar as they are supported by general consent, and 
it is this capacity, and not the capacity of acting out of physical force which 
is common to governments and criminals, what constitutes the criterion of 
political legitimacy: invulnerable power is not something that one is free for 
getting. Let us remind that the right to power is nothing else that capacity to 
keep absolute power. This is why rulers always try to control and to shape 
public opinion: because they know that, lacking popular support, they 
become private citizens, that is, they are rulers any more.
In order to meet the second objection it is apposite to pay attention to 
the laws governing the development of private tyrannies. Spinoza was fully 
aware of the means deployed by private governments to manipulate public 
opinion,14 but he thought that sooner or later these strategies undermine the 
very conditions of political power, leading to the collapse of the system. In 
this sense, he anticipated Marx’s analysis of the paradoxes involved in a 
political structure based on possessive individualism.
What I mean is that, according to Spinoza, private governments are 
incapable to gain the unflinching support of the population without losing 
their condition of private governments. When common fear ceases, common 
judgment returns, and no one can rule or can be ruled by permanent fear. 
What private governments whose biggest fear is fear of the power of 
people acting by common accord («guided as if by one mind») are able to 
do is to keep people away from the political arena, to keep them divided, 
entertained, closed in a private world, in short, to lock free associations and 
to restrict spontaneous social ties in order to keep population unaware of their 
common power. This is the only kind of consent that private governments 
can gain from their subjects: the consent of a herd. The only problem of 
this procedure is that, lacking the common power that they have destroyed, 
private tyrannies stand on their own, that they are doomed to be toppled 
in front of the indifferent eyes of a rabble unwilling and unable to support 
them. Whether meek or violent, private sovereigns only are able to delay 
their fate. This is their only right. 
If we add that states that surrender to corporations whose only objectives 
are short-term benefits corrode the very fabric of civil society (general 
welfare), and hence that they undermine the very root of their power, we’ll 
be able to appreciate why liberty, welfare and civil power are co-dependent 
notions. If we thought of Spinoza as too naive, let us think again: up to now, 
14 Cfr. Spinoza, 2007: 256; G III: 245.
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the best politics for the individual have being the politics of democracy and 
common welfare. 
«The real agitators are those who attempt to do away with freedom of 
judgment in a free republic –a freedom which cannot be supressed» (Spinoza, 
2007: 258; G III: 246).
Conclusion 
Along this paper I have suggested that it would be wise to apply a theory 
that Spinoza designed in order to raise robust safeguards against religious 
zeal and intolerance to our current predicament. Had Spinoza lived today, 
his main enemy had been corporations, not Churches. Corporations affect 
the cohesion, stability and orderliness of the state as well as individual 
liberty and freedom of thought. Nowadays they mark the difference between 
slavery and citizenship.
I also was anxious to underline that Spinoza’s political thought cannot 
be claimed by the right or by the left. I am convinced that these notions are 
completely useless, and that they don’t apply to Spinoza. On the one side, 
social democrat thinkers are too in love with the opposition between rights 
and laws and with notions taken from Rousseau to pay close attention to 
Spinoza. On the other side, true conservatives (those who, far from being 
supporters of unaccountable corporations, are rank and file members of 
Burke’s commonwealth) could feel at ease with his political thought: his 
affection for the proliferating variety of human existence, the importance 
he concedes to obedience and reverence, his design of a system of balances 
in order to control arbitrary power, his reluctance to tamper with the forms 
of the state, his rejection of international powers independent of the 
commonwealth, and a closet Aristotelism of sorts that prods him to stress 
the positive, strong, and non-liberal claim that human beings are natural 
political animals, that is, that we are beings that achieve our full realisation 
only in terms of each other, -these aspects are things that a conservative is 
able to appreciate. In this respect, I would like to stress that for Spinoza the 
form of the government is irrelevant to democracy. Monarchy, aristocracy 
and popular government are susceptible of being democratic. Republicanism 
is the converse of arbitrary and private power, not the converse of a 
constitutional monarchy. 
Making explicit the paradoxes of classical contractualism, the dualisms 
on which traditional theories of rights are based, and the intellectual delusions 
whose results are both aggressive individualism and transcendent utopias 
of a communism of minds, Spinoza bursts a conceptual framework that 
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only replaces the alienation of prejudices by the alienation of abstract and 
un-historical reason, making of academic political philosophy a useless 
and hermetic activity. Curiously, Spinoza’s main teaching is that, insofar 
as essence and existence cannot be severed, the roots of a rational politics 
are necessarily particular and historical. His political thought does not 
fall under the attitude aptly described by Oakeshott as “rationalism in 
politics” (Oakeshott, 1991: 5-42), and so it may prove equal to the task of 
understanding the multifarious conflicts of a post-Enlightenment’s world. 
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